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A Catholic Theology of Grace and Freedom

Friends of mine occasionally indulge in a long-standing family dispute. The mother is deeply committed to the Christian faith and often debates with her son regarding the importance of her religion. When good things happen in the world, God deserves all of the credit; when bad things happen, God should get none of the blame. Human beings are arrogant to think that they have any ability to effect solutions to the world's enormous and complex problems. Instead, they should place their trust in God and not in human powers. The son, on the other hand, insists that the fate of the world is up to human beings. We, not God, have the responsibility to end war, reverse the effects of pollution, fight racism and sexism, curb economic exploitation and eliminate other forms of oppression and hatred. Religious people, he believes, shirk their responsibility by appealing to God for help; they should be doing something to change the world, not whining to some distant and dubious deity to intervene and clean up the mess that we human beings have created for ourselves.

On the surface, the views of mother and son are opposites. For one, God is the only solution to the world's woeful state of affairs; for the other, if there is to be an end to the evils of this life, it must come from human effort. Mother and son tacitly agree, however, that God's grace and human effort are mutually exclusive options. Either God lifts human beings out of the

mire in which our own stupidity and malice have landed us, or we do it for ourselves. Salvation is either our own work or it is God's.

This either/or presupposition imagines God and humanity as two beings alongside one another, each ready to salvage the world. Only God is up to the task of doing so, the mother thinks. For the son, on the other hand, if there were such a powerful being, it should not be counted on to do anything. After all, God's track record isn't good—look at the mess the world is still in! So if we want to change the world we must do it ourselves.

If you are comfortable with either the mother's or the son's position, this essay is intended to make you uncomfortable. But if you feel uneasy about taking either side of this debate, then you are ready to question the relationship between divine action and human effort are necessary elements of any adequate theology of grace. Both mother and son assume that there is competition between divine grace and human freedom, but is this true? What follows is an exploration of some of the key historical moments in the theology of grace. After a brief look at the biblical data I turn to the great Augustine of Hippo, the man whom John Henry Newman claimed to have "formed the mind of Europe." This formation is never more evident than on the question of grace. Then I note the advance made by the great medieval scholars who, thanks to a linguistic innovation by the thirteenth century Chancellor of the University of Paris, were able to think about grace while maintaining the integrity of human freedom. Finally, in the twentieth century I summarize the way Bernard Lonergan transposed this medieval synthesis into a contemporary subject-centered or personalist theory of the way in which grace operates within the free human person.

The conclusion will be that a Catholic theology of grace does not—and must not—force a choice between divine assistance and human effort, but rather seeks to understand how God works in and through the intelligent and responsible behavior of human beings.

Augustine's Drama of Grace and Freedom

One cannot read far in the Bible without noticing two fundamental claims. First, God exercises power and authority over all things, including human behavior. Second, people are held responsible to God for what they do. The Bible simultaneously insists that humans are dependent on God, and that they are responsible for what they do. How might we understand the relationship between freedom and God's providence, both of which are deeply embedded throughout the Bible? In the centuries after the age of the apostles Augustine of Hippo (354-430), a convert to Catholic Christianity and a bishop in North Africa, was the first great theorist of the relationship between human freedom and divine providence. His thinking stressed that grace (1) is absolutely gratuitous (a free gift from God to humanity and never something that is earned or that God owes), (2) heals the damage to human freedom that results from sin, and (3) raises human nature to a reality that goes beyond what was originally given in creation. The full expression of Augustine's theology of grace, which has had a profound influence on the history of theology, was occasioned by the preaching of the British reformer Pelagius who was distressed at the moral laxity of so many Christians after Constantine liberated the faith from imperial persecution.

To acquire an understanding of the dispute between Augustine and Pelagius, it is necessary to enter the world that Pelagius and Augustine inhabited. That world was shaped by the still fresh memory of the sufferings of the Christian martyrs. After the Emperor Constantine

in the early fourth century had allowed freedom of worship, the deep faith and courage of those willing to follow Christ in an act of self-sacrificing love was now no longer needed. Pelagius was shocked by the ease with which new Christians entered the Church and claimed the name of Christian, a name that had cost the martyrs so much. The emperor's prohibition of persecution, following a very severe attack on the Christians by the former Emperor Diocletian, meant it was suddenly no longer difficult or risky to be a Christian. Monasticism—"white martyrdom" as it came to be known—was an effort to regain that sense of complete self-sacrifice displayed by the martyrs. Monks were to imitate Christ not by shedding their blood but by a life-long process of self-giving through celibacy, fasting and other forms of personal discipline called "asceticism." The monk Pelagius, in other words, was very concerned about what today might be called "Sunday only Christians," people for whom being Christian was a good idea for reasons that were not focused on the heart of the gospel call to conversion. Pelagius promoted a more authentic way of life within the Church and stressed the freedom and responsibility of the human person to be more faithful.

While visiting Rome Pelagius had heard the following words of Augustine's *Confessions*, quoted by a bishop: "Give me the grace to do as you command, and command me to do what you will."[1] Pelagius took Augustine's prayer to be an unhealthy denial of the power of free will and thus a threat to the principle of moral responsibility and the reform he sought to bring about.

Robert Markus summarizes the anxiety caused by the new freedom of the Christian in Roman culture.

> The heated debates in Western Europe around the year 400 on the meaning of perfection had their roots in the uncertainty about what it meant to be a genuine Christian in a society of fashionable Christianity. In a world in which outward conformity with the

> religion of the establishment was hard to distinguish from real commitment, the call to authentic Christianity often took the form of conversion to some form of the ascetic life.[2]

Augustine himself was strongly attracted to the ascetic ideal and in fact formed a monastic community soon after his baptism. However, in contrast to Pelagius, whose rigorous views placed a premium on human will power, Augustine's own moral struggles helped him to understand that without grace there is ultimately no freedom. Left to their own devices, people are prisoners of their own moral powerlessness.

The problem, Augustine argues, was that the bonds in which he was imprisoned were imposed by his own will.[3] When he was young he used to pray that the chains of lust be removed from his heart, but not right away! Augustine's self-deprecating comment reveals his awareness of the need for the two necessary elements in the drama: true human freedom and divine grace. Freedom without grace is not effectively free, and yet grace without freedom would leave the human will out of the equation. What Augustine wanted was an authentic liberation of his human will, a solution that did not compromise his freedom but rather restored it.

Although his mother was a staunch Christian, Augustine himself did not embrace Christianity until he was thirty-three years old. At a certain point in his spiritual journey Augustine recognized that what God has revealed in Christ is true but his response to that reality was not forthcoming. It was, he said, as if he were heavy with sleep, unable to awaken. At the end of a series of attempts to control his sexual appetite Augustine discovered that the solution to this inner turmoil is to be found only in God's grace. In the Confessions the figure of Lady Continence asks Augustine, "Why do you try to stand in your own strength and fail? Cast yourself upon God and have no fear. He will not shrink away and let you fall. Cast yourself upon Him without fear, for he will welcome you and cure you of your ills."[4] And so it came to pass:

Augustine turned his life over to God in that paradoxical surrender whereby the strength of his freedom was restored.

Many years after Augustine's conversion, Pelagius came to Rome preaching a message of moral reform. Augustine observed in the monk's teachings a lack of appreciation for humanity's absolute dependence on God. Augustine had come to realize in his own struggles that the human being is to God as the infant is to her mother's breast.[5] While this image dramatically presents the need for grace, it does not suggest how the milk of unearned grace is integrated with the human powers of reasoning and choosing. When God acts in the human person, how can those human powers resist being completely overcome by God? Can we continue to speak of human freedom in such a graced state?

Perhaps the most famous line from Francis Ford Coppola's great film *The Godfather* comes from Don Vito Corleone as he explains how he would persuade a movie producer to give his godson an acting role in an upcoming production. "I'm going to make him an offer he can't refuse." The "offer" that Vito Corleone makes, of course, severely diminishes the receiving party's freedom because it comes with a not-so-subtle threat of violence. In the context of the film, two human wills, both of them corrupted by sin, compete for dominance. One will win at the expense of the other; for one will to be done, the other must be diminished. The mobster in the movie is not really making an offer that might be accepted or refused; he is simply reducing the other's freedom. It is a sheer matter of force and not persuasion. This Godfather is not at all Godlike.

In contrast to the Godfather's offer that cannot be refused, Augustine speaks of God's grace as a "congruous call," the divine influence on human will that operates within and according to the God-given nature of human freedom. Human freedom is from God before it can

be opposed to God. God persuades and enables the sinner to turn away freely from sin and toward God. "He calls the man on whom he has mercy in the way he knows will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call."[6] God, the Creator of human freedom, works not in competition or by coercion, but through the mystery of a gracious liberation of our God-given desires. Neither human freedom nor divine providence is left out of Augustine's theology of grace. In his growing dissatisfaction with Pelagius' teachings on responsibility, however, Augustine became ever more wary of the Pelagian tendency to give credit to human freedom independent of grace. Augustine insisted that only *because* of God's grace do we have the freedom to achieve our divinely intended goal, our full participation in the life of God. God's grace gives us freedom and restores it when we distort and weaken it by sin.

One of Augustine's scriptural sources was Paul's teaching about the love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom 5:5). Pelagius' moral rigor replaced this loving God with something like a drill sergeant: God expects us to shape up and has given us the freedom to do just that. Monks and moral teachers such as Pelagius were certainly right to find in the New Testament the call to moral conversion; in their insistence on our obligation to turn from sin and toward God, they were responding to a central theme in the teaching of Jesus and the early Christian tradition. But the development of Christian thought is driven by new questions arising out of new circumstances or challenges to the faith. The New Testament writers do not raise the question that came to the fore in the dispute between Pelagius and Augustine: when God bestows grace on the human soul, is that gift given to those who, independent of grace, merited it or at least were disposed to receive it?[7] For Augustine, love itself—the longing built into the human heart—is a gift of God's love that is directed to God as to its goal. We come from, are made for,

and return to God. The entire drama of grace and freedom is God's gift of love. Not for nothing did the Christian tradition dub Augustine "the Doctor of Love."

The medieval synthesis

One of the most important developments in the theology of grace occurs in the thirteenth century. Augustine's reflections on grace were in a psychological key; his own experiences, combined with his training in classical rhetoric, gave his work a persuasive force that continues to ring true in the experiences of many to this day. The rhetorical and symbolic horizon within which Augustine and the rest of the early Fathers wrote, however, is not the only possible horizon. A new theological situation emerged and the rise of new questions, stimulated by changing cultural circumstances. By the twelfth century, as a result of increased trade and the rise of cities there emerged in the twelfth century a humanistic renaissance, a cultural movement that sought to explore all aspects of what it means to be human. In this new climate, which witnessed the birth of the European universities, theologians again turned their attention to the problem of reconciling grace and freedom. This time, however, the circumstances dictated a shift in perspective—from Augustinian rhetoric to medieval metaphysics.

To understand this change in mental perspective, let us note that the human person is capable of a shift from the "dramatic" to the "theoretical" pattern of experience. The dramatic pattern is intent upon things as they affect us: the aesthetic pleasure of the bird watcher, the care and concern of one who cares for a sick parent, or the experience of the first disciples upon encountering the Risen Lord.[8] Augustine's concerns reflect the dramatic pattern of consciousness; he wanted to understand the ways in which God's grace affected him in his own particular situation. His *Confessions* tells the dramatic story of how in one soul God's grace overcame the weight of his sin and transformed his life. The intellectual pattern of experience,

however, is preoccupied with the relationship of things to other things: the ornithologist measuring a bird’s wing speed and relating that to its life span, or the health care professional researching possible causes of a disease, or Athanasius, defender of the creed of Nicea, formulating a proposition to express the relationship between the Father and the Son.

Thanks to the reintroduction of Aristotle’s metaphysics to Christian Europe in the twelfth century by Arab scholars, the medieval scholastics shifted from a dramatic to an intellectual pattern of experience. Aristotle’s philosophy, unlike that of Plato which had been the dominant influence on Christian theology before the Middle Ages, was systematic; its ideas were linked together by mutually related meanings. Following Aristotle, the medieval scholastics now wanted an explanation—a systematic theory—of God’s grace operating within human freedom. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) was the greatest representative of this new age in which much of theology shifted from a monastic style of prayerful reflection on the symbols of sacred scripture to a more “scholastic” or theoretical style. A new intellectual pattern of inquiry was emerging from the ferment of cultural changes that were occurring in the cities and their new universities.[9] This change in theological method signaled the rise of what would today be called a “systematic” theology in which the meanings of precisely defined technical terms were now determined not by their symbolic and experiential force but by their relations with other such terms linked within a system.

In this changed context, the focus of theological work on the reality of grace was not psychological but metaphysical. In other words, the question posed had to do not so much with the human drama of grace in the concrete circumstances of life as with an explanation of how this reality called “grace” works within the human person who continues to be free. The breakthrough in this effort was made possible by the invention of a technical term—“the

supernatural"—credited to Philip the Chancellor, a predecessor of Aquinas at the University of Paris.

The term "supernatural" is fraught with potential misunderstanding. To clarify how it functioned in the thirteenth century, consider first that, in one sense, absolutely every good thing is given by God. To bring this home you need only realize that the next breath you take, the next bear of your heart, the very fact that you *have* a heart and lungs, is due to God's creative and sustaining favor. But if all is grace, what was Augustine talking about when he described his conversion? For example, how could the theologians speak of the transforming gift of continence in Augustine without, on the one hand, imagining it as an alien divine "stuff" added from outside of his freedom or, on the other, reducing it to a simple matter of human effort? Philip and the theologians like Aquinas who followed invoked the term "supernatural" to denote the realm of grace, where "nature" is the realm of created things and agents—it has its own laws and tendencies and modes of operation, but none of these apply to their Creator. The word is an abstraction, as is "supernatural," because it does not correspond to any actual human being's lived situation. A purely natural human being would be sinless, and that is not a being in the world.

The systematic meaning of the terms "nature" and "supernatural." means that they cannot be separated without a loss of understanding. Philip's definition of "the supernatural" did not add anything new to what the tradition had known all along about the need for God's healing grace. It did, however, allow the theologians to give full attention to the way in which human nature worked without continually worrying about how a higher power might be altering it. "Nature" has its own laws, tendencies and modes of operation, but none of these apply to their Creator. The laws of human freedom, or any other laws of creation, simply do not apply to God, who

invented free agents. As their Source, God is not within that created order. The term "supernatural" created a distinction that allowed for an uninhibited inquiry into the workings of the world, including human nature, because it eliminated the mistaken desire to place divine grace and human effort on the same level. In the human realm, people do not cease to operate in a human way when they receive God's grace. In fact, it is just the opposite: we cannot be fully human without the healing restoration of God's grace.

Philip's term "supernatural," therefore, has nothing whatsoever to do with a layer of divine favor separable from the built-in and divinely intended goal of every human life. This misreading of the idea of the supernatural, popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, imagined that grace has its own powers which, when conferred, are added on top of those of a self-sufficient human nature. This misinterpretation presented human nature as having a natural end or goal that fell short of God; grace was above nature, hence "super" (above) nature, added on or external to our natural way of being human. What is lost in this misinterpretation is an understanding of the very destiny of the human being, which is God alone. Human longing, the deepest desire of the human heart, finds its destiny in God. Without that destiny, desire might function in partial ways to aid us during our allotted time, but finally, there is no "finality," no goal, no end to the journey. It is this destiny—this *telos* or target inscribed on the human heart—that gives life its desire and inclination toward God.[10]

The "extrinsic" misreading of the term is linked to Augustine's key insight regarding the unearned, unmerited gift-like quality of grace. This essential truth about grace led some to picture human thought, choices and action as operating independently of God's saving grace, which remains extrinsic to human nature. Grace is imagined as added on to an already complete human nature.

By the thirteenth century the theologians in the West had accepted the essential elements of Augustine's critique of the Pelagians. In continuity with this tradition, Aquinas taught that the natural or built-in human desire for God is not enough to heal us of the effects of sin. To be healed of our alienation from God and other people we need a new and higher principle of action and being. When God provides what we need, the human desire for God is graced with the means for its own fulfillment. As Aquinas put it, what we cannot do on our own we can do with the help of a friend.[11] The divine friendship makes it possible for human beings to achieve the end for which they are made. The graced human being, then, is thoroughly human; God not only respects and preserves the integrity of human freedom but causes them! Freedom, weakened by sin, is liberated to be fully itself. God's grace becomes the principle of action in the converted human being, in whom there is human freedom precisely because of the action of grace.[12]

Human nature, with its reason, freedom and a natural desire for God, is completed by faith, hope charity, the three "theological virtues," so called because they are God's gifts which transform our living and orient us toward the properly human end God intends for us. Grace is not, therefore, something that is added onto an already complete nature but is that divine friendship which makes it possible for our natural desire to reach its goal. God is not increased by creation, nor diminished without it; as Robert Sokolowski puts it, "[t]he most fundamental thing we come to in Christianity, the distinction between the world and God, is appreciated as not being the most fundamental thing after all, because one of the terms of the distinction, God, is more fundamental than the distinction itself."[13] The distinction between God and creation is itself a part of creation and therefore does not determine what is possible for God. To put this simply, God has freely made the distinction, which exists, along with the rest of creation, to express God's glory. The world is not the given reality within which God operates; creation is

not something that happens in an already-there world. Rather, all of creation, including the very fact that there is anything other than God (the distinction between God and the world), is as it is because God freely made it that way.

The free human act is always that of a creature with a God-given goal or end. God made us as we are and thus gave us our end—our destiny. Freedom does not, therefore, include the power to choose our end. That has been given already by the Creator; God our goal draws us into a full participation in the life of the Holy Trinity. The divine action of drawing or luring the human being into the divine life, therefore, must never be imagined as in competition with our own human desires. Only a distorted human desire, which leads to sin and therefore alienation from God, is contrary to this pull of grace.

Scholasticism degenerates

If Aquinas marks the highpoint of the medieval theology of grace, the theological tradition after Aquinas developed an unfortunate tendency, beginning with Duns Scotus (1264-1308), to imagine competition between Creator and creature. God's assistance was conceived as external to the creature's will. Scotus downplayed the intelligibility of God's creation: he insisted that human reason cannot know nearly as much about God's purposes as earlier generations had supposed. The result was a separation of intellect and will. With the downgrading of reason came the upgrading of freedom.

Scotus thought of the human will as the absolute origin of choices. Freedom was utterly autonomous. God's will was also viewed as apparently arbitrary—we cannot begin to understand why God does what in fact God does. Such presumptions created serious problems for an understanding of grace and freedom. Within Scotus' theological horizon (which became increasingly common in theology after the thirteenth century and is often identified as

"nominalism"[14]) the language of grace will conjure up pictures of two very unequal agents: the human being and a powerful not-to-be-denied Being. In other words, if you think of your freedom and God's grace as in any way on the same level, then you have (perhaps unwittingly) reduced God's activity in the world to creaturely action. Picture your life as a car and ask, "Am I in the driver's seat or is God?" The picture creates a pseudo-problem and cannot do justice to the theological question of grace and freedom. The question does not recognize the need to think about grace without imagining it as interfering with human thinking, deciding and acting. It was to avoid this confusion that the term "supernatural," as Philip and Aquinas used it, was conceived.

"The supernatural," properly understood, causes the Scotist conundrum to vanish; once one realizes that there is no created analogue to God's causing, human freedom and divine grace can never be in competition. The term, when not distorted into an image of something added on to human nature in some external fashion, will correct the tendency of the imagination to picture God's actions in the world, and on our freedom, as being an alternative to or functioning alongside of natural human powers. As created, freedom operates within the universe governed by God's eternal and unfathomable wisdom, but as true human freedom it works according to its own integral nature. God is not an external agent whose involvement in human affairs signals our enslavement. Salvation is liberation of what is authentically human; our freedom and our dependence on God's grace increase proportionately.

Having eliminated any competitive version of the grace-freedom relationship, freedom is best understood as "being for love." We come from and are meant to return to God, our Source and Fulfillment. In his writing on the Incarnation, the supreme act of divine love, Aquinas notes that we are more likely to love if we are first the recipients of love.[15] The Incarnation causes us

to love, not through force or intimidation—God does not make us an offer we can't refuse—but by drawing us into a relationship of love.[16]

This relationship requires freedom; the human person must be free in order to respond in love to God's invitation to a new life. Love, mercy, forgiveness—these realities simply cannot exist without freedom. God is the author of human freedom Who draws the free creature toward the ultimate Good, which is God alone. God, in other words, is our own deepest desire, the cause and ultimate target of the desires of the human heart. As our end, given in our beginning, God calls us out of our own egoism and into the life of love, for God is love (1 John 4: 16).

Our love for God is a gift of God's love for us. This means that our response to God is not that of mere gratitude toward a superior but is rather one of authentic, free love. Jesus says in the gospel of John that he call his disciples not servants but friends (John 15: 7-17).[17] We are made to be friends of God and our lives are oriented toward that unchosen, already given goal. This friendship is what St. Paul speaks of when he says that if anyone is in Christ he is a new creation.[18] Anything in contradiction to this love, anything that prevents us from loving fully, is sin.[19]

A Contemporary Transposition

In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas brought systematic order to Christian teachings that had evolved over centuries. As is true of all thinkers, however, Aquinas' horizon was limited. Between the thirteenth and the twentieth centuries, great cultural changes occurred. The scientific revolution changed the way one thinks about the natural world while historical consciousness impressed upon us the fact of change in matters that were thought to be

changeless. Finally, there is the modern attention to the human subject whose operations intend the objects on which science and historical analysis centered.[20]

Bernard Lonergan has done for contemporary theology what Aquinas did for the Middle Ages. His approach takes into account modern developments of science, history and psychology; he makes the modern concern for the person fundamental to his method in theology. Lonergan rejected nothing affirmed in the great achievements of the medieval period; he does not, for example, reject the necessity of metaphysics, the affirmation of what is objectively real. Rather, he begins with a different starting point: the intending human subject and makes the facts of human cognition the ground on which a “metaphysics” can be based. Lonergan’s method draws our attention to the fact that the human person, whose operations of attending, imagining, thinking, judging, evaluating and deciding, is a reality that can be known. One can come to know, through these same operations, that one is indeed a knower of what is real. Indeed, the human inquirer is a knowable reality in a real and knowable world.

In a cultural climate that places great stock in the experience of the person, Lonergan’s approach integrates psychological, sociological and historical insights that have emerged in the modern period. For the theology of grace, the transposition to this new cultural situation means that we recognize the human person as a project, a being in process, and so grace and freedom operate within the context of human development. Quentin Quenell, commenting on Lonergan’s theology of grace, puts it this way: “We do not begin [life] in possession of the development which only living itself can furnish us with. We begin as a self which is the center of its own universe and only gradually do we come to perceive another self which we could—and know we should—become.”[21] Our growing awareness of the self we should become—and our means of becoming it—is the operation of God’s grace in our lives. Lonergan illustrates the project of self-

making by noting that "each of us is engaged in publishing the one and only edition of ourselves."[22] This experiential process is utterly free and yet is also completely within and a part of the world governed by God's providential care. Being in love with God—a state of being that is itself a gift of God's love for us—propels and directs our development toward authentic living. To speak paradoxically, grace makes us willing to live in a state of free, loving openness to God's will in all things.[23] Lonergan retains the great metaphysical achievement of Aquinas while integrating Augustine's interest in the psychological experience of grace within a modern and post-modern context.

What moves us is what we love—and what we love has been given to us as a gift. We are more likely to love one who has loved us first.[24] Love requires that we ask questions about how to live. Being in love with God is not a vague emotion; it is a trajectory, at the heart of an individual's project of self-making, toward ultimate truth, goodness and beauty, which can be nothing but God. God's gift of love is felt in the nagging discomfort we feel when we cannot understand something that we know is important to get right. God's love produces the shame we feel when we violate our consciences. Divine love creates the deep longing we have for what is true, good, and beautiful. But "love" here does not necessarily have a romantic connotation; sometimes there is little feeling that accompanies it. At times, love will take the form of a dogged persistence in the tasks that must be performed if we are to remain true to ourselves, which means true to the gift of God's love. In these existential experiences God is not operating as an external force but rather is acting upon us as the very drive that propels us toward a more authentic life.

Conclusion

With the help of divine friendship, we are able to do what we could not otherwise do. We are not God's puppets but rather agents seeking to come to that end for which we have been created. How else do we make sense of the New Testament's insistence that we are responsible for our actions and that there are eternal consequences attached to them? Reason and human freedom do not have to be compromised in order to affirm the necessity of grace.

So too with grace: it resides in the soul not as one option among many but as an orientation for one's entire life, the horizon of one's whole being, the satisfaction of one's desires. It doesn't take away our freedom but rather builds on it and thus raises it up. God's love for us, which is often experienced as our loving God and our neighbor, enables, empowers, and therefore gives freedom. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is," Paul claimed, "there is freedom" (2 Cor 3:17). The Spirit of love—the bond of Trinitarian love that united the Father and the Son—is the source and fulfillment of human freedom. We have freedom so that we may grow in the bond of charity, so that we may share in the very life of God. That love is the gift of God flooding our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us (Rom 5:5).

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[1] *Confessions* (Penguin Classics, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin, 1961), Book X, 29.

[2] Robert Markus, "From Rome to the Barbarian Kingdoms (370-700)" in John McManners (ed.) *The Oxford Illustrated History of Christinaity* (Oxford, 1992), 67.

[3] *Confessions*, VIII.5. 10, 164.

[4] Ibid., VIII.11.27.

[5] Ibid., II.3.6.

[6] *Ad Siml*. 1.2.13. Quoted in William Collinge's fine introduction to the Pelagian controversy in Saint Augustine: *Four Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. John A. Mourant and William Collinge (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic

University of America Press, 1992), p. 11.

[7] See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume One (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 4.

[8] For the distinction between the dramatic communication of common sense via symbol and the theoretical differentiation of consciousness see my article "The Drama of Religion and the 'Theory' of Theology," *Cardinal Perspectives*, 1997.

[9] On this transition see M.D. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago, 1968; orig. 1957).

[10] On the modern theology of "pure nature" see Stephen Duffy, *The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought* (Liturgical Press, 1992).

[11] *ST* 1-2, 59.4.2. See also *Summa Contra Gentiles Book* 3.

[12] Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 87ff.

[13] Robert Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 33.

[14] On the historical emergence of nominalism see Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (Yale University Press, 1993).

[15] *ST* 3.1.2.

[16] "Acts are most willed when done from love."*ST* 1-2, 4.

[17] See P. Perkins, *Love Commands in the New Testament*, (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), pp. 108-110.

[18] See 2 Cor 5: 17; on friendship in Aquinas see *ST* 1-2.113.3, and Paul Waddell, *Friendship and the Moral Life*, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.

[19] Burrell describes as "a holding back from letting oneself be caught up into the full dynamics of action." *Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions* ((Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 125.

[20] See Bernard Lonergan, "Mission and the Spirit," in *Third Collection* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 27-28.

[21] "Grace," in Vernon Gregson (ed), *Desires of the Human Heart: An introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan* (Paulist, 1988), p. 171.

[22] Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject," *Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), p. 83.

[23] In the traditional language of Christian faith, charity is a theological virtue because it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom 5:5).

[24] Aquinas, in *ST* III, 1.2, quoting Augustine's *Enchiridion*.